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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PIONEER FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11133

DAHL RAY POWELL and
BONNIE RAE POWELL, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from Summary Judgment for debt in favor
of Plaintiff Pioneer Finance & Thrift Company in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County. Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 18, 1967, Pioneer Finance and Thrift
Company brought an action against Dahl Ray Powell
and Bonnie Rae Powell, his wife, to recover on a
note and chattel mortgage signed by the Defendants (Appellants here) during an appointment at
the Plaintiff's office (Respondent here) on Septem-
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ber 6, 1966, which appointment had been made be.
tween the Plaintiff and Defendants by one Melvin
A. Stanley, dba Stanley Furniture and Appliance.
In addition to the claim for debt, the Plaintiff also
alleged that the Defendants had obtained money
from the Plaintiff by false pretenses.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
On Motion for Summary Judgment by the
Plaintiff, a hearing was held in the Third Judicial
District Court before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Judge, which hearing resulted in a judg.
ment for the Plaintiff for the debt claimed against
the Defendants but denied judgment on Plaintiff's
allegation that the Defendants had obtained money
by false pretenses. It is from the Summary Judgment
for debt which the Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of judgment against
them for debt on the grounds of fraud in the inducement; failure of the Respondent to act in good faith
to avoid an unconscionable contract; failure of a
condition precedent; want or failure of considera:
tion; and remand for trial of the case on the ground
that the Appellants' allegations of fraud and faihm
of consideration were such as to require factual
determination by trial before judgments for debt
could properly be rendered against them.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 6, 1966, Melvin A. Stanley, hereinafter referred to as "Stanley" made an appointment with the Respondent, Pioneer Finance and
Thrift Co., hereinafter designated as "Pioneer", for
the Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Dahl Ray Powell, hereinafter designated as "The Powells" to go to Pioneer's office and sign a note and chattel mortgage.
Pursuant to the appointment made by Stanley, the
Powells went to Pioneer's office and executed commercial paper contemplated by Stanley's making
the appointment.
Since an important part of the defense against
collection of that note by Pioneer involves an alleged
wide-spread fraudulent plan engaged in by Stanley,
some history of Stanley and description of his modus
operendi which describe the "commercial setting"
in which the Powells contracted to pay money to Pioneer will be of more than passing interest to this
Court.
Melvin A. Stanley established a business of
which he was the proprietor known as Stanley Furniture and Appliance, located at 779 East Third
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, sometime in 1955 or
1956. (R 22)
Though Stanley's business with his customers
appears to have been legitimate until about 1962, his
payment record with his creditors from the time
he began his appliance business until 1964 grew
steadily worse. Between 1957 and 1964, fourteen
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suits for n?n-payment of debt were filed against
Stanley which resulted in eleven unsatisfied judg.
ments against him. Five of the judgments wert
obta~ned by finance companies, one such judgment
was m excess of $30,000.00. (R 22)
The fact of Stanley's i1isolvency was known fr,
the finance compardes through routine inquiry to
the Salt Lake Credit Bureau, Dun & Bradstreet, or
their own "Lenders Exchange." Such infornwtioi•
was not available to his customers [such as tht
Powells]. (R 22)

It is apparent that beginning in about 1962,
when Stanley closed his bank account and began
transacting all his business with cash, Stanley's creditors were about to close his doors unless he could
come up with some cash. Consequently, at that time,
he conceived the idea that he could generate work·
ing capital to meet the pressing claims which, if not
paid, would close his doors, by inducing some of hi~
old customers to sign conditional sale contracts at
his place of business, which Stanley could sell to
finance companies and generate immediate cash for
him, if he delayed purchasing and delivering the fur·
niture. As is customary with conditional sale con·
tracts, the finance company furnished Stanley with
forms which Stanley handled directly for them.
(R22)
Beginning in about 1965, most of the finance
companies [including the Respondent Pioneer] t(i
whom Stanley had been selling conditional sale con·
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tracts became sufficiently suspicious of the possibility that there might be something wrong with Stanley's conditional sale contracts and in order to try
to insulate themselves from Stanley's plan, began refusing to accept contracts signed in Stanley's store
and insisted that he "produce the bodies" by having
his customers come to the finance company offices
where customers signed notes and chattel mortgages
in the presence of loan company personnel. ( R 22)
In order to induce his customers to sign without
first receiving their furniture, Stanley promised to
make the payments to the finance companies called
for by the defendants' note and chattel mortgage.
All these payments for finance companies, Stanley
made faithfully until Stanley's bankruptcy in No\'ember, 1966. (R 23)
At first, Stanley made the proposition that he
would deliver furniture and make finance company
payments to a few former customers such as 65-yearold Ladislao Cruz who neither read nor wrote either
Spanish or English and whose command of spoken
English was very limited. During the period 1962 to
1966, Stanley induced Mr. Cruz to sign ten contracts.
Mr. Cruz did not know which finance company's paper he was signing since he could not .read and Stanley
made the payments directly to several of the finance
companies involved. Mr. Stanley delivered all or part
of the furniture on about half of the contracts Mr.
Cruz signed and since Cruz was not making the payments, he felt he was in no position to press Stanley for delivery of the furniture. ( R 23)
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Following 1962, Stanley gradually enlarged his
scheme by contacting a number of other Spanish
speaking former customers who were employed at
such installations as Kennecott and Ajax Press and
induced them to sign conditional sale contracts. He
delivered enough of the furniture, in cases other
than those at bar, to give credence to his claim that ·
he would deliver furniture and pay the finance companies. ( R 23)
As the snowballing cost of finance charges and
high interest and delivering at least part of the
furniture began to overcome him, Stanley persuaded
some of his earlier customers to whom he had delivered furniture and for whom he was making payments, to become "shills" and induce their fellow
workers, at first only Spanish speaking but later
English speaking, to go to finance company offices
and sign notes and chattel mortgages to pay for
furniture Stanley promised to deliver. (R 23) (Also
see Defs.' Deposition, p. 4, 26)
In each case the new recruit was induced by
Stanley to remain silent about the arrangements by
persuading him the scheme was available to only a
limited few "working men" who Stanley wanted to
"help." [see Defs.' Deposition p. 27] The arrangement was not available to just anybody. There are
several cases where two brothers did not know the
other was involved because the injunction not to tell
anyone else about his scheme except on Stanley's
specific instruction was so skillfully and powerfully
planted by Stanley in his victims' minds. (R 24)
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It was established in Stanley's bankruptcy hearing that by 1965 and through November, 1966, when
he filed for bankruptcy, even though Stanley was
receiving as much as $28,000.00 per month from finance companies generated by his ever-enlarging
scheme, he was able only to make the finance company payments without delivering any or only a
small part of the promised furniture.

Thus the finance companies themselves became
the principal beneficiaries of Stanley's scheme. (R
24)

In each case, when one of Stanley's shills would
contact a prospective customer, he would honestly
tell the prospect that Stanley had been in business
for many years; that he and other people he personally knew had received their furniture and that
Stanley was making the payments. This personal testimony was powerful enough to bring even more
sophisticated prospects into the scheme. Some did not
take Mr. Stanley's explanations about kick-backs and
profitable investments at face value and realizing his
prices were high, purchased the furniture in the confidence that it would be delivered. They had personal testimony of fellow employees that Stanley delivered and even though the prices were high and if
later Stanley was unable to pay off the finance company, since they were buying furniture they needed
anyway, they would be able and willing to pay the
finance company obligations. [see Defs.' Deposition
p. 26, 39]
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Stanley did not deliver promised furniture tn
the Powells in the case at bar and since they had received nothing for the note and chattel mortgage
they had signed, refused to continue payments to
Pioneer after Stanley quit supplying the money for
the payments and filed bankruptcy in November,
1966. (R 25)
Stanley's bankruptcy petition lists some FIVE
HUNDRED (500) FAMILIES which he had
brought into his confidence game and sought to discharge his obligations to them in the amount of approximately FIVE HUNDRED TH 0 US AND
($500,000.00) DOLLARS. (R 25)
It is apparent that Stanley, using the fact that
he had been in business for many years and by employing shills who could honestly say they had received their furniture and that Stanley was making
finance company payments, engaged in a highly
successful confidence scheme against the Powells and
hundreds of others. ( R 25)

ARGUMENT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF PIONEER FINANCE
COMP ANY IS NOT A PURCHASER FOR
VALUE, AND NOT A HOLDER OF AN INSTRUMENT IN DUE COURSE, CONSEQUENTLY,
THE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE POWELLS, MELVIN A. STANLEY, AND PIONEER
MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND
ARE GOVERNED BY ORDINARY SALES OR
CONTRACT LAW vVHEREUNDER THE NOTE
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BECAME 'ENFORCEABLE AGAINST DEFENDANTS BY VIRTUE OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT [ARGUMENT TWO AND THREE]
FOR FAILURE OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT [ARGUMENT FOUR] AND FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION [ARGUMENT
FIVE].
The transaction between Pioneer and the Powells wherein the Powells signed a note and chattel
mortgage with Pioneer as payee took place in Pioneer's office on September 6, 1966, more than nine
months after the effective date of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, which Code enunciates the law
governing this case.
By definition, to be a negotiable instrument, a
writing must conform to the requirements of a
"Draft" (Bill of Exchange) - "Check", "Certificate of Deposit" or "Note." [See Sec. 70A-3-104,
(2) U.C.A.] The chattel mortgage signed by Appellants does not meet these requirements for negotiable instruments. While the note is a negotiable
instrument, in this case the note was never nego-

tiated.

The note was never acquired by an innocent
purchaser for value; it is still in the hands of Pioneer, the original party to the contract, which is
here bringing suit for its collection. Consequently,
the Respondent has none of the special protection
provided for holders in due course provided in the
Uniform Commercial Code and Section 70A-3-306
U.C.A. bears directly on this case.
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"70A-3-306. RIGHTS OF ONE NOT
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. - Unless he
has the rights of a holder in due course any
person takes the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of
any person ; and
( b) all defenses of any party which
would be available in an action on a simple
contract; and
( c) the defenses of want or failure of
consideration, nonperformance of any condition precedent, nondelivery, or delivery for a
special purpose .... " [emphasis added]
Lest there be a lingering doubt whether the
note, because it is by definition a negotiable instrument should be given by special protection beyond
that provided by contract law alone, attention is
called to 44 ALR 2d 31 :
"It is a well-known rule that in the hands
of any holder other than a holder in due
course, a negotiable instrument is subject to
the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable.
8 Am Jur, Bills and Notes§ 355.
"Under this rule, even if the instrument
executed by the purchaser to the seller in a
secured chattel sale transaction is negotiable,
where the transferee [finance company] suin~
thereon is not a holder in due course he orchnarily is not protected agm·nst def ens es which
the chattel purchaser-obligor could asse:·t
against the seller of the chattel. This point is
supported and illustrated by the numerous
cases listed in §20 [g], infra, in which a par-
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ticular transferrer was found not to be a holder in due course, and by the following cases,
which demonstrate its expression and application .... "
A case directly in point wherein the seller of
the goods failed to make delivery of the goods which
were promised and the finance company tried to collect on its note despite failure of the dealers warranties, is Mutual Finance Co. v Martin, 63 So 2d
649, 44 ALR 2d 1, ( 1953) wherein after finding
that the finance company plaintiff was not a holder
in due course, the Supreme Court of Florida states
at 44 ALR 2d 7 :

"The argument has been advanced by
appellant that this case should be reversed
and that this Court should hold the finance
company to be a holder in due course of the
note and that personal defenses are unavailable against it. Appellant says that unless this
is done it 'will destroy the long established
precedent of the State of Florida and thereby
seriously affect a certain mode of transacting
business adopted throughout the State in reliance thereon.' It may be that our holding
here will require some changes in business
methods and will impose a greater burden on
the finance companies. We think the buyer Mr. & Mrs. General Public - should have
some protection somewhere along the line. We
believe the finance company is better able to
bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the
buyer and in a far better position to protect
his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers ....
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"If this opinion imposes great burdens
on finance companies it is a potent argument
in favor of a rule which will afford protection
to the general buying public against unscntpuloiis dealers in personal property." [emphasis added]

In the case at bar. the dealer Stanley was likewise insolvent and unable to respond in damages. In
the Mutual Finance Co. case, supra, the dealer did
deliver some goods, though not as warranted. In the
case at bar, the dealer Stanley delivered nothing.
ARGUMENT TWO
THE POWELLS WERE INDUCED TO SIGN
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE FOR PIONEER
AS PART OF ST AN LEY' S WIDESPREAD
FRAUDULENT SCHEME OR CONFIDENCE
GAME PERPETRATED ON THEM AND 500
OTHER UTAH FAMILIES BY M.A. STANLEY,
DBA STANLEY FURNITURE COMPANY.
Melvin A. Stanley fraudulently induced the
Powells to go to Pioneer's office and sign a note and '
chattel mortgage for Pioneer. The fraud perpetrated
by Stanley on the Powells complies with all of the
requirements of an allegation of fraud as enunciated
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Fisher, 79 U
115, 120, 8 P2 589 ( 1932) ; Pace v Parrish 122 U
141, 247 P 2d f73 (1952) and other cases and is set
forth with particularity as follows:
(a) Stanley falsely represented to the Appellants that he could and would deliver to them fur-
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niture of their selection and that he could and would
repay monthly to the finance company the money
necessary to sa ti sfy their note ;
(b) Stanley made these fraudulent representations to the Powells barely two months before filing
hiB bankruptcy petition, [which petition showed a
ratio of debt to assets of 600 to 1] knowing his
representations were false, since though he had been
able to induce enough new participants in his scheme
to make the promised cash payments to finance companies until November 10, 1966, he had not been
able to buy and deliver to his customers all of the
promised furniture for more than two years prior to
hi,s bankruptcy petition. In September, 1966, when
Stanley made his promise to deliver furniture to the
Powells and make finance company payments, he
knew his promise to deliver furniture was false because he had been unable to deliver any furniture
in the several months prior to September, 1966. His
bankruptcy petition of November, 1966, showed approximately $600,000 of debt to $1,000 of assets.
( c) That Stanley, knowing for more than two
years that he could not perform all his promises to
deliver furniture and make finance company payments, made these false and fraudulent representations with intention to cheat and defraud the gullible
Appellants;
( d) That an actual fraud was perpetrated on
the Powells in that they signed Notes in reliance on
Stanley's false representations; Stanley did not fulfill his promise to deliver the furniture and since
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November 10, 1966, did not repay the money required to satisfy the Pioneer note and left the defrauded Powells with an obligation under that note·
'

( e) That Stanley, using his position as the person with the most actual knowledge of his business,
falsely and fraudulently represented to his customers
that his business operations were profitable and that
he could perform his promises by virtue of, among
others, the following reasons: ( i) That he received
special discounts and rebates from furniture and appliance suppliers which they paid preferentially to
Stanley because of his large volume of business with
them, (ii) that he received money each month as
fees or kickbacks from the finance companies for
bringing customers to them, (iii) that the profits
thus generated were sufficient to pay for furniture
he promised to deliver and also to repay monthly cash
sufficient to satisfy their notes, thus inducing his
customers to sign the notes and turn the proceeds
over to him in reliance on Stanley's representations.
(R 33-34)
While it may be argued that Stanley's promise
to deliver furniture at a future date did not necessarily constitute a fraud since Stanley might argue
he intended to fulfill his promises when made, the
same cannot be aid of his statements that he was
presently receiving special discounts from manufacturers, investing his money in profitable ventures
and receiving kickbacks from finance companies, all
clearly mis-statements of existing fact, and which
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were used by him to induce hi,s customers to enter
into hi,s scheme. ( R 34)

The South Carolina Supreme Court in Page v
Pilot L. Ins. Co. 193 SC 59, 5 SE 2d 454, 125 ALR
872 ( 1939) holds that even a promise of future performance which, as here, was made as part of a
general plan may constitute actionable fraud as follows:
"A future promise is not fraudulent, unless such a future promise was part of a general design or plan existing at the time, made
as part of a general scheme to induce the signing of a paper or to make one act, as he otherwise would not have acted, to his injury."
[emphasis added]
Certainly Stanley engaged in a general plan
to have been able to induce 500 families and 20 finance companies to engage in his scheme.
The disparity between the business experience
of the Powells and of Pioneer is such as to meet the
requirement of the Utah Supreme Court to the effect
that the Appellants must show that they had a right
to rely on Stanley and Pioneer as set forth in Johnson v Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 Pac 2d 134, 159 ALR
256 (1945), and more recently in Reese v Harper,
8 Utah 2d 119, 329 Pac 2d 410, ( 1958). Stanley
and Pioneer were in business for many years. Stanley sold merchandise to many individuals on a legitimate basis before he began his fraudulent undertakings. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind
that the Powells are young (24 years old) and
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inexperienced in business (reared on rural Utah
farms) [Def. Deposition p. 3] and that Stanley induced them to join his scheme through the employment of a shill, namely, David Hunt, [Def. Deposition p. 4, 26, 28] who had been a life-long friend of
Mr. Powell and who himself had been induced to
join Stanley's scheme by an innocent friend. Mr.
Hunt honestly told the Powells that Stanley had been
in business for many years and was, therefore, not
a fly-by-night operator. He also told the Powells
honestly that Stanley had delivered furniture to him
and was fulfilling his promise to make the finance
company payments on his obligations.
Lest there be an inclination to impute fraud to
the Powells reference should be made to 23 Am
J ur, Fraud and Deceit, Sec 182 where the following
will be found:
"Relief will often be granted to a party
who was ignorant of the fact that a scheme
was fraudulent and entered into it in reliance
on the representations of the other party as
to its honesty.
"Equity often interferes for the relief of
the less guilty of parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the party on
whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests."
ARGUMENT THREE
THE NOTE AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE
SIGNED BY THE POWELLS WERE INDUCED
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BY, WERE COLLATERAL TO, AND WERE
TAINTED WITH THE FRAUD OF STANLEY'S
PROMISES AND ARE UNENFORCEABLE BY
PIONEER SINCE PIONEER BREACHED ITS
STATUTORY DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH
AND AVOID UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS.
In Scow v Guardtone, 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 Pac
2d 643 (1966) the Utah Supreme Court found the
finance company was not relieved from the impact
of Guardtone's fraudulent contracts merely because
of the finance company's self serving disclaimer that
the obligations to them were not affected by Guardtone's fraudulent contracts. (see 417 P2 at 644.)
As in Guardtone, the case at bar is an "integrated whole" ( 417 P2 at 644) with Stanley arranging for loans and sending his agent to accompany
the Powells and others to finance company offices
with a list of furniture and dollar amount in Stanley's own handwriting [Def. Deposition p. 6] and
supplying Pioneer with credit information. His own
handwritten list of furniture upon which both the
Powells and Pioneer relied may well be an integral
part of the contract between the Powells and Pioneer.
The reasons the Powells believe Pioneer had
knowledge of Stanley's fraudulent activities are summarized as follows :
Pioneer had done business with Stanley for several years, at first by buying his conditional sale
contracts and later, when Pioneer learned something
to make it fear Stanley's conditional sale contracts,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
changed to executing notes and chattel mortgages directly with customers, such as the Powells, that Stanley made appointments for. Pioneer knew Stanley
was insolvent and had no inventory or credit, since
between 1957 and 1964, fourteen suits for non-payment of debt were instituted against Stanley which
resulted in eleven unsatisfied judgments, five of said
judgments, all unsati.sjied, having been obtained by
finance companies, one of which was in the amount of
$30,000.00; they chose to disregard information regarding Stanley's business history and methods
which was supplied to them by the Salt Lake Credit
Bureau, Dun & Bradstreet, and by the "Lenders Exchange," a non-profit clearing house in Salt Lake
County maintained by finance companies for the
very purpose of supplying the finance companies
with information about borrowers and about sellers
whose paper Pioneer purchases; Pioneer knew from
its considerable experience with Stanley customers
that many items sold under his contracts were grossly
overpriced; that the contracts covered color television
sets, expensive stereo sets and some exotic items beyond the usual level of living of many of Stanley's
customers; they knew Stanley was insolvent, and consequently had no credit, and owned no inventory; sold
from catalogues and floor samples and Pioneer knew
that Stanley could not have made delivery of the
furniture covered by the chattel mortgage at the
time it was executed; Pioneer knew, even though
Stanley was insolvent, that his business was large
and "hopped" from one to another finance company
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rather than being placed with one or a few of them
which is the usual for furniture stores.
Pioneer knew that all Stanley customers had
perfect payment records with them. There was no
delinquency either while Pioneer was taking assignments of Stanley's conditional sale contracts nor
during the last year or so before Stanley's bankruptcy when Pioneer, along with all other finance companies, with legal power to do so, shifted from purchasing conditional sale contracts to making so-called
"direct loans" with customers Stanley made appointments for.
Pioneer hoped to insulate itself from whatever
fraud Stanley might be perpetrating by changing
from assignments to direct loans. Instead, Pioneer
implicated itself even deeper in Stanley's fraud by
becoming an immediate party rather than an assignee ; they acted with reckless disregard for the
effect of Stanley's dealings on his unsophisticated
customers.
Pioneer breached the positive duty imposed upon it to conduct its affairs in good faith as set forth
in Section 70A-1-203 U.C.A. and to heed notice as
defined in Section 70A-1-201 (25):
" ( 25) A person has 'notice' of a fact
when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
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( c) from all the facts and circumstances
known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists."
[emphasis added]

As stated in 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 80,
"Good faith is generally regarded as exercising reasonable diligence to learn the truth
"
Pioneer also breached its duty to avoid the execution of unconscionable contracts as set forth in
Section 70A-2-302 U.C.A. The breach of which duty
has been held in several recent cases as grounds for
denying recovery by finance companies as shown in
17 ALR 3d 1010 Sec. 57 as follows:
"Uniform Commercial Code §2-302 (1)
provides that if the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may ref use to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
"Applying this provision, the courts have
held in a number of cases that an unconscionable clause in a sales contract was unenforceable ...
"In Frostifresh Corp v. Reynoso ( 1966)
52 Misc 2d 26, 274 NYS 2d 757, a Spanish-
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speaking salesman sold a refrigerator-freezer
to a husband and wife for a cash sales price of
$900, plus a charge of $245.88. The cost of
the refrigerator-freezer to the seller was $348.
When the husband told the salesman that he
had only 1 week left on his job and could not
afford to buy the appliance, the salesman
told them that the appliance would cost them
nothing because they would be paid bonuses
or commissions of $25 each on the numerous
sales that would be made to their friends and
neighbors. The retail contract was entirely
in English, and was neither translated nor
explained to the buyers. In granting judgment against the buyers for only $348 with
interest, less the $32 paid on account, the court
said that the contract was unconscionable under Code § 2-302 because the price and terms
were shocking to the conscience. It pointed
out that the service charge alone almost
equaled the cost of the appliance and that
the buyers were handicapped by a lack of
knowledge both as to the commercial situation
and as to the nature and terms of the contract, which was submitted in a language foreign to them. [emphasis added]
"Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver
(1964) 105 NH 435, 201 A2d 886, 14 ALR
2d 324, was relied on in State by Lefkowitz
v !TM, Inc. ( 1966) 52 Misc 2d 39, 275 NYS2d
303, in which the court enjoined the operation
of a "referral-sales program" as unconscionable, finding specifically that the contracts
entered into with buyers under the program
were unconscionable under Code § 2-302 ( 1) .
Under the plan, the consumer received a commission for each prospect who was referred

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
by the consumer and who also made a purchase. The promoters charged over $900 for
a simple broiler, over $1,500 for a color television set, and almost $1,000 for a vacuum
cleaner. They made numerous misrepresentations as to the products involved, and, the
court said, their plan had the vice and quicksand nature of all rndless-chain transactions.
In finding that the contracts were unconscionable under Code § 2-302 ( 1), the court said
that they were unconscionable because not
only was the price unfair but also the contracts were procured by deceptive practices."
[emphasis added]
The immediate profits including prepaid interest, investigation fees, profit on insurance premiums,
often amounting to from $200 to $500 on a single
Stanley contract, plus the prompt payment records
of Stanley customers (prompt because payments
were made by Stanley himself) may well have induced Pioneer's management to cast aside caution,
"ride the balloon", and "take a chance" despite their
knowledge of Stanley's insolvency and unsavory business record.
Pioneer took its chance with Stanley's unsavory
business and enjoyed the high profits generated by
Stanley's business for several years. In view of
Pioneer's failure to abide by its statutory duty of
care and failure to heed the most obvious signs of
insolvency and fraud, surely Pioneer cannot now
be allowed to shift its burden to innocent young people who had neither the business experience nor ac-
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cess to the Lenders Exchange, the Salt Lake Credit
Bureau or Dun & Bradstreet, all of which resources
Pioneer had, to avoid an unconscionable contract.
Pioneer may claim it did not know of Stanley's
operations but under the Uniform Commercial Code,
Pioneer had a positive duty to act in good faith and
avoid an unconscionable contra·ct. One of the most
elementary principles of jurisprudence teaches that
one does not fulfill a positive duty merely by closing his eyes thus avoiding to see the obvious.
ARGUMENT FOUR
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A HOLDER IN
DUE COURSE AND STANLEY'S FAILURE TO
DELIVER THE PROMISED GOODS CONSTITUTES A FAILURE OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
POWELLS AND PIONEER.
As stated in Sec. 70A-3-306, U.C.A. quoted in
argument ONE above, since Pioneer is an "immediate party" and not a holder in due course, the
"nonperformance of any condition precedent" is
available to the Powells as a defense against enforcement of their contract with Pioneer.
When taken as a whole, in the transaction between the Powells, M.A. Stanley, and Pioneer, there
can be no doubt that the Powells fully expected Stanley to deliver the furniture he promised to sell to
them. Also in the absence of absolute fraud, on its
part, Pioneer also expected Stanley to deliver.
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Stanley's handwritten list of furniture (see Def.
Deposition p. 6) with a dollar amount which was
acted upon by Pioneer is part of Pioneer's file and
may actually be a written part of the contract itself
between the Powells and Pioneer. At the very least,
the handwritten list is written evidence of what the
condition precedent consisted of. Delivery of the
furniture was certainly a cond'ition precedent to payment of money by the Powells under the contracts
contemplated by both the Powells and Pioneer at the
time the note and mortgage were executed.
At Section 668, WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3d
ed Page 152 has the following to say with respect to
conditions:
" ... Conditions may be created by the
manifested assent of the parties thereto, or
they may be created by the law from the terms
or nature of the contract without any manifestation of assent to their creation. From this
viewpoint, conditions fall into two broad
classes:
( 1) The express condition; and
( 2) The constructive condition, also frequently called a condition implied in law.
In Ross v Harding, 391 P2 526 (1964) the Washington Supreme Court quoted WILLISTON favorably
as follows:
" [ 6] Whether a provision in a contr~ct
is a condition, the nonfulfillment of which
excuses performance, depends upon the intent
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of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair
and reasonable construction of the language
used in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. 5 WILLISTON CONTRACTS
(3rd ed) § 663 p. 127" [emphasis added]
Lest it be thought that the law of condition precedent applies only to a failure by a party to perform,
see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, where in
Chapter 10, Sec. 257, Comment "a" at page 367 the
following will be found:
"A condition may be a performance by a
party to a contract or some other event. The
condition may be the present existence of a
fact or its future occurrence. The party may
warrant or promise that the fact exists or
shall occur or he may not so promise. Such a
promise as in other cases, may be inf erred
from conduct as well as stated in words."
In the case at bar, the "other event" contemplated by the parties was the delivery of the furniture by Stanley.
See also Chapter 13, Section 395 of the RESTATEMENT, Comment "a":
"Sections 250-325 (Chapters 10, 11)
state the rules governing the requirements
for a duty of immediate performance. A conditional right to performance arises as soon
as the contract is made, but the duty does not
mature or become one of immediate performance until later. The condition must first
occur, and the terms of the contract may require it to occur at a particular time or within
a limited period .... " [emphasis added]
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Stanley never delivered the furniture so the
"condition" never occurred, and so the duty of the
Powells to pay under their note is "not mature."
11 Am Jur 2d BILLS AND NOTES § 664
states:
"664. Breach for conditional delivery or
delivery for spe~ial purpose.
"As between immediate parties, and as
regards a remote party other than a holder
in due course, delivery of an instrument may
be shown to have been conditional, or for a
special purpose only, and thus it is a defense
as to such parties that an instrument was delivered on a condition precedent which has not
been performed . . . " [emphasis added]
In Cockrell v Taylor, 122 Fla 798, 165 So 887,
105 ALR 1338 (1936) the Supreme Court of Florida
cites at length the Utah Supreme Court in this
Court's decision in Martineau v Hanson, 47 Utah
549, 166 P 432, 433, (1916), as authority for the
proposition that parole evidence may be used to establish that a note was manually delivered to another on a condition precedent which failed and
constituted a valid defense against collection of said
note, as follows :

"' "It is familiar law, notwithstanding
some conflict in the authorities, that a person
may manually deliver an instrument, though
it be in the form of commercial paper, to another, on its face containing a binding obligation in praesenti of such person to such other,
with a contemporaneous verbal agreement
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that it shall not take effect until the happening of some specified event; and that the
paper as between the parties will have no
validity as a binding contract till the conditions shall have been satisfied; and that proof
of such condition does not violate the rule that
a written instrument cannot be varied by a
contemporaneous parol agreement; that such
evidence only goes to show that the instrument
never had vitality as contract."
" 'While the fact that the note in question was delivered only upon the condition
that it should not become a completed or enforceable contract unless the purchaser of the
lands in question paid the sum stated is not
as directly pleaded as it might have been, yet
it seems clear to us that the condition is sufficiently set forth, and that, as pleaded, it constituted a condition precedent to the right of
recovery on the note, and one which the parties
could legally agree upon ... '"
To the same general effect, see Glendo State
Bank v Abbott Wyo. 216 Pac 700, 34 ALR 296
(1923) where the Wyoming Supreme Court said:
"The plaintiff [bank] is named as payee
in the note. At the trial it introduced the note,
and rested. The defendant then introduced
evidence tending to prove that he signed the
note and delivered it to one Dix, who was
soliciting subscriptions for shares of stock in
a corporation called the Western Life & Casualty Company; that Dix took the note for
the purpose of delivering it to that company,
with the understanding that the company
would issue and send to defendant 500 shares
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of its capital stock, or return the note; that the
defendant did not receive the shares of
stock. ... " [emphasis added]

Also see Franklin Discount Co. v Ford 27 NJ
473, 143 A 2d 161, 73 ALR 2d 1316 (1958) where
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said:
"The effect of the eight lines reciting
the consideration was to prohibit the defendants from showing a contrary parol agreement, a right which they would otherwise have
under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
plaintiff was not a holder 1:n due course. Thus,
the endorsers under R. S. 7 :2-16 NJSA might
show a parol agreement that the delivery was
conditional upon the extension of a new line
of credit, or, what amounts to the same thing,
under R. S. 7 :2-58, NJSA, that there was a
failure of an agreed-upon consideration."
[emphasis added]
The list of furniture and dollar amount in Stanley's own handwriting which was given to Pioneer at
the time of execution of the note here sued upon and
which is still in Pioneer's possession must clearly
show that the note was executed by the Powells and
delivered to Pioneer on the condition that the Powells
would receive the listed furniture.
ARGUMENT FIVE
PIONEER, NOT BEING A HOLDER OF AN
INSTRUMENT IN DUE COURSE, THE NOTE
AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE SIGNED BY THE
POWELLS ON BEHALF OF PIONEER ARE
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE
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POWELLS BECAUSE THE POWELLS RECEIVED NO CONSIDERATION FOR SIGNING
THEM.
The Respondent, Pioneer, is not a holder in due
course nor an innocent purchaser for value of the
note upon which it now sues the Powells. In fact,
Pioneer is an immediate party to the contract on
which it sues. Accordingly, the provision of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-306 cited
in Argument ONE above is applicable here and "the
defense of want or failure of consideration" is available to the Powells.

Black's Law Dictionary (Second Edition), West
Publishing Company, 1910, defines consideration
as follows: "CONSIDERATION. The inducement to
a contract. The cause, motive, price, or impelling
influence which induces a contracting party to enter
into a contract. The reason or material cause of a
contract." (Citations omitted.)
M. A. Stanley made the appointment with Pioneer for the Powells to go to its office to borrow
money to pay for furniture which Stanley promised
to deliver to the Powells. The Powells delivered to
Pioneer a list of furniture in Stanley's own handwriting showing a dollar amount to be charged for the
furniture, which amount was the net amount ( exclusive of interest and other charges) the Powells
promised to pay Pioneer. That handwritten list is in
the possession of Pioneer; it is part of the over-all
contract and is written evidence that the Powells
expected to receive furniture as consideration for
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promising to pay money to Pioneer. [see Def. Deposition p. 25, 26, 37, 38] The Powells were handed a
check, prepared prior to their arrival on Stanley's
telephone instructions. The check was payable to Mr.
Powell and to M.A. Stanley.

Since Pioneer is not a innocent purchaser for ,
value, and is in fact an immedjate contracting party,
as stated in Section 70A-3-306 (b) U. C. A., the
Powells may defend against collection of their note as
"in an action on simple contract ..."
The furniture contained in Stanley's list was
never delivered. Hence, the Powells did not receive
the "cause, motive, or impelling influence which induced them to enter into the contract," to pay money
to Pioneer as required by Black's definition of consideration.
While it is true that Pioneer gave a check to the
Powells, the check was consciously designed by Pioneer to be worthless to the Powells. The check could
not be converted into money or anything else of value
by the Powells themselves.

,

If it be contended that delivery of the check which
the Powells could not cash was consideration for
their entering into a contract to pay money to Pioneer, then that check was delivered for a "special
purpose" viz., to be re-delivered to Stanley with no
value in itself to the Powells.

Since the Powells received nothing of value
to them for contracting to pay money to Pioneer, the
Powells' promise to pay said money is unenforceable
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against them for want or failure of consideration.
This principle is illustrated by WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS, illustration No. 3, Sec. 167, Sub 1:
"A [Stanley] has a bilateral contract
with B [the Powells] in which the promises
are dependent. A [Stanley] assigns his rights
thereunder to C [Pioneer], who informs B
[the Powells] of the assignment. Thereafter,
A [Stanley] wholly fails to perform his own
duties under the bilateral contract. C [Pioneer] has no right against B. [the Powells]
"
The foregoing rule is cited in Thorp Finance Corporation v LeMire 264 Wis 220, 58 NW 2d 641, 44
ALR 2d 189 ( 1953) and is shown by ALR to have
considerable authority since its Editors cite cases in
support of that same legal proposition from Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Following the above citations,
ALR 44 2d summarizes the law at page 32 as follows:
"Thus a dealer's fraudulent misrepresentations as to the condition and value of an
automobile in selling it to the defendant constituted a defense available to the defendant
purchaser as against a trans! eree of the note
and conditional sale contract, where the latter
was not an innocent purchaser for value. Com-
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mercial Credit Co. v. Childs ( 1940) 199 Ark
1073, 137 SW 2d 260, 128 ALR 726."

,

If a misrepresentation by the seller as to the
condition of the product sold is a defense against the
finance company which was not a holder in due
course, surely failure of the seller to deliver anything
must be a defense available to the Powells here.

To hold that the Powells must pay the amount
called for in the note when they did not receive the
furniture which induced them to enter the contract,
would be to clothe Pioneer with the special attributes
of a holder in due course or an innocent purchaser
for value while in fact, Pioneer is merely an immediate contracting party.
That defense of failure of consideration is a
defense against collection of the Powells' note by
Pioneer is also clearly illustrated in Mutual Finance
Company v Martin, 63 So 2d 649, 44 ALR 2d 1, 7
( 1953) wherein the Supreme Court of Florida cites
the Supreme Court of California:

1

"See also Commercial Credit Corp. v. •
Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal 2d
766, 214 P 2d 819, 822 (1950), where the
Supreme Court of California said:
" 'When a finance company actively participates in a transaction of this type from '
its inception, counseling and aiding the future
vendor-payee, it cannot be regarded as a holder in due course of the note given in the tr.ansaction and the defense of failure of consid~r
ation may properly be maintained. Machine
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Works never obtained the press for which it
bargained and, as against Commercial, there
is no more obligation upon it to pay the note
than there is to pay the installments specified
in the contract.'" [emphasis added]

The Florida Court continued:
"To paraphrase the last sentence of the
above quotation to fit the instant case, 'Martin never obtained the deep freezer he bargained for, and as against the finance company there is no more obligation upon him to
pay the note than there is to pay the installments specified in the conditional bill of
sale.' "
Similarly, in A. A. Murphy, Inc. v Banfield,
Oklahoma, 363 P 2d 942, (1961) Murphy, the finance
company, endeavored to collect on a note executed
by Mr. and Mrs. Bogard to join in a "food freezer
plan." After finding that the finance company was
not a holder in due course, the false promises by the
"Plan" salesman and the "Plan's" failure to deliver
the freezer promised, were defenses against collection of the note by the finance company. Speaking for
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Berry, Justice,
states:
"Since plaintiff is not a holder in due
course, the provisions of 48 0.S. 1951 § 127,
are applicable, and defendant buyers could interpose as against it all defenses available between themselves and the payee (Banfield) .
" [ 10] Apart from failure of consideration, defendants' principal reliance for rescis-
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sion was placed upon fraud in the procurement of the notes and mortgages. The evidence
in su:ppo~t of this issue is likewise undisputed.
Banfield s agents (whose authority was not
de?ied) represented that a new Markett refrigerator-freezer combination unit would be
deliver.ed; ... Later a secmidhand freezer box
of a different make was delivered .... Defendants did not know the terms of the note
until they checked the chattel mortgage on
file and received a statement of payments
from plaintiff finance company ... This conduct, as we view it, was not incompatible with
nor did it preclude equitable rescission. Frick~
enschmidt v Garner, 17 4 Okl 559, 51 P 2d
537; Davis v Gwaltney, Okl 291 P 2d 820.
"In an action on a promissory note by
one who is not a holder in due course, both
fraud in the procurement of the note and absence or failure of consideration are valid defenses." [emphasis added]

It seems clear from the foregoing that failure
of consideration is a defense available to the Powells
against Pioneer since Pioneer is not a holder in due
course, and the Powells did not receive the furniture.

ARGUMENT SIX
THOUGH THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE EX·
ECUTED BY THE POWELLS RECITED THAT
THEY HAD RECEIVED DELIVERY OF THE
FURNITURE FROM STANLEY, THE POWELLS·
ARE NOT NOW ESTOPPED TO SET UP STAN·
LEY'S FAILURE TO PERFORM AS A DEFENSE
AGAINST PAYMENT OF THE NOTE NOR
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DOES THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE PREVENT THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH WANT OR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
Though it is true that the chattel mortgage
signed by the Powells included "small print" stating
that the Powells had possession of the goods being
purchased from Stanley and pledged to Pioneer, the
evidence will also show that when the Appellants
went to the finance company offices in company with
Stanley's agent, Hazel Stulsky, "everything was
ready"; finance company personnel had all or most
of the papers made out in advance; Stanley had already supplied credit information. [Def. Deposition
p. 13, 35, 36]
The procedures were "rushed" taking only 15
to 20 minutes for completion. The Appellants did
not have time to read and comprehend the chattel
mortgage they signed. No effort was made to explain
the nature of the papers signed by the Powells at
the finance company office. [Def. Deposition p. 36,
37]
Citing again the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in Thorp Finance Corporation v LeMire, 264 Wis
220, 58 NW 2d 641 (1953) where that court points
out at 44 ALR 2d 189 in a footnote citing Am Jur
Estoppel § 39:
"The proper function of equitable estoppel is the prevention of fraud, actual or constructive, and the doctrine should always be
so applied as to promote the end of justice and
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accomplish that which ought to be done between man and man. Such an estoppel cannot
arise against a party except when justice to
the rights of others demands it and when to
refuse it would be inequitable."
Though in LeMire, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was dealing with an assigned contract rather
than a note and chattel mortgage, since it found the
finance company not to be holder in due course, and
since Pioneer is not such a holder in this case, the
principles enunciated in LeMire are applicable here.
In LeMire, the court went on to say at 44 ALR 2d
189:
"The finance company would be prevented from invoking estoppel against LeMire,
based upon the recital of delivery of the mer·
chandise, if the finance company, at the time
it purchased LeMire's contract, was not acting in good faith and exercising due diligence.
The law with respect to this is well stated in
19 Am Jur, Estoppel 739, 741, sec 86:
" '... Good faith is generally regarded,
however, as requiring the exercise of reasonable diligence to learn the truth, and accord·
ingly estoppel is denied where the party
claiming it was put on inquiry as to the ~ri.d/1
and had available means for ascertaining
it ....'
" ... The trial court made a statement in
the record after counsel for the plaintiff had
moved for a directed verdict explaining the
court's reasons for granting such motion. I.n
such statement the trial court declared that it
would be a violation of the parol evidence rule
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to permit LeMire to prove that the furniture
being purchased by him from Stoltz had never
been delivered when the contract itself recited such delivery." [emphasis added]
The Court in LeMire then cites Jones, EVIDENCE, COMMENTARIES, (2d Ed) p 2859, Sec
1563, with respect to the parol evidence rule as follows:
"We point out in preceding sections that
evidence extrinsic to a writing which goes in
legal avoidance of the entire writing or agreement is admissable. When entire want of consideration is pleaded, or offered to be shown
under such form of pleading as may warrant
such showing, the offer of proof goes to an
avoidance of the entire agreement and to show
that the writing is without legal force. The
same is true where failure or consideration
is set up. It is immaterial whether the attempt
be regarded as one to establish fraud or merely as going to the matter of performance and
enforceability. Viewed in either aspect, the
substantive law recognizes a remedy, and that
remedy goes to the very existence of the writing as a legally effective and enforceable
thing. It goes, not in contradiction of any
term, but to the entirety. Thus in actions on
bills and notes or other contracts the defense
is frequently interposed, and proved by means
of extrinsic evidence that the agreement was
without consideration, or that the consideration has failed. The same applies to bills of
sale, releases and other writings. And the
recital in an adoption not under seal of the
receipt of consideration may be contradicted
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for ~he purpose of showing the inyalidity of
the mstrument for want of consideration"
[emphasis added]
·
Volume 44 ALR 2d 205 shows additional in.
stances in which obligor was not estopped to prove
failure of consideration by parole despite the ob.
ligor's prior acknowledgement of receipt of the property and cites Parker v Funk, 185 Cal 347, 197 P 83,
44 ALR 2d 205 ( 1921) as follows:
" ... where the defendant had executed
a conditional sale contract covering the purchase of property described as 'one Ameston
truck unit and Ford automobile, Motor No.
17577717,' and had acknowledged therein receipt of 'said property,' and that it was in good
condition and repair, but the fact was that
the contract covered the purchase of a truck
which was to be constructed by the vendor out
of a Ford automobile then in his possession
and a certain truck unit which was to be at·
tached thereto, and the vendor had not completed and delivered the truck when the contract was signed and in fact never did deliver
it, the defendant purchaser was held not es·
topped by contract or in pais, by such acknowl·
edgement of receipt of the property, to defend
an assignee's action upon the conditional
sales contract on the ground that the vendor
had never delivered the completed truck to
him and that his liability was conditional up·
on such delivery rather than absolute as in·
dicated by the contract. The court viewed the
conditional purchaser's recital or receipt of
the property as being, in this instance, merely
a recital of receipt of the consideration, not
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intended to be acted upon by a transferee of
the contract, and not barring the defendant
chattel purchaser from showing as against
the assignee that the consideration has failed.
The holding that there was no estoppel by contract was placed upon the ground that the acknowledgement of receipt of the described
property was in effect but an acknowledgement of receipt of the consideration for the
contract, and that it is always open to a party
to dispute the recital of a consideration."
[emphasis added]
To a similar effect, the Annotation cites American Nat. Bank v A. G. Somerville, Inc. ( 1923) 191
Cal 364, 216 P 376; General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v Whitehead ( 1931) 1963 SC 236, 161 SE 494,
Southwest Contract Pu'f'<chase Corp. v McGee (1947
Tex Civ App) 296 SW 912, Judgment affd 120 Tex
240, 36 SW 2d 978; MaUis v Lounsbury (1927) 193
Wis 531, 214 NW 332 and Geocaris v Carell,as
(1912) 174 Ill app 232.
Despite the "small print" in the chattel mortgage acknowledging possession of the furniture
promised by Stanley, under the circumstances, the
Powells are not now estopped to deny that they ever
received that furniture.
ARGUMENT SEVEN
THE CASE AT BAR IS NOT PROPERLY A
SUBJECT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE
THE PLEADINGS OF THE DEFENDANTS ALLEGE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT AND
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, BOTH OF
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WHICH ARE FACTUAL ISSUES TO BE DETER.
MINED BY THE TRIER OF THE FACTS.
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Summary Judgment, states in part:

I

" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions
and admission~ on file, together with the affi'.
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any niaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a nwtter
of law. A summery judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue
of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages."
The Complaint alleges that the Powells owe Pioneer $1,679.00 based on a note and chattel mortgage
executed by the Powells for Pioneer. Pioneer is not
and does not claim to be a holder of the note in due
course. Consquently, fraud in the inducement and
failure of consideration are available to the Powells
against Pioneer's attempt to collect thereon and both
are questions of fact.
The Powells' Affidavit states that they received
no consideration for their note, (R 13) and their
Answer states that Stanley defrauded them by in·
ducing them to sign the note in furtherance of his
fraudulent scheme. (R 10) It seems clear that Stan·
ley's fraudulent scheme was collateral to the very
commercial paper he induced the Appellants to sign
for Pioneer Finance Company.
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The facts as alleged therefore clearly place this
case within the scope of Scow v Guardtone 18 Utah
2d 135,417 Pac 2d 643 ( 1966) where at 417 Pac
2d 645 the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"We turn to a consideration of the rights
of the Assignee, the Defendant, Prudential
Federal Savings. It is pertinent to observe that
the fraud, having been established to avoid
the contract with Guardtone, the burden of
showing it was an innocent purchaser for
value, was upon Prudential ... "
and at 646:

"From the facts recited herein, it is our
opinion that there was a basis in the evidence
upon which the jury could fairly and reasonably refuse to believe that the Defendant,
Prudential Federal, was an innocent purchaser and which forced the conclusion that it was
bound by the judgment rescinding the contract for fraud."
Though Stanley has not actually been sued by
the Powells because he cannot respond in damages,
and the law does not require the doing of futile acts,
there can be small doubt that the Powells could prevail against him on the basis of his failure to deliver
the furniture he promised and on his fraudulent
promises to them. If so, Pioneer's collateral note
would be unenforceable against the Powells under
the Guardtone rule.
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Under Rule 56 ( c) all the allegations in the
Complaint must be uncontroverted by the defendant
before it would be appropriate to issue a summary
judgment against the defendants. It seems clear
that under the law enunciated in Scow v Guardtone
supra, the Answer alleges facts, which if true, state
a valid defense to the Complaint.
I

If there bP doubt that Stanley's promises were
collateral to the Powell's contract to pay money to
Pioneer, it should be remembered that the list of
furniture and dollar amount in Stanley's handwriting is now and from the beginning has been in Pioneer's files.

The furniture listed by Stanley was copied onto
the Chattel Mortgage and the dollar amount shown
in Stanley's handwriting was the amount of the net
proceeds of the note and the amount of the check issued by Pioneer showing Stanley as a payee.

CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded, with instructions
as to the governing law, for trial of the facts by a
jury to determine whether the Appellants were in
fact fraudulently induced to enter into their contract
with the Respondent; whether their contract contemplated delivery of furniture to the Appellants as
a condition precedent to the ripening of their obliga·
tion under their note; whether the Respondent had
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sufficient notice, but failed to fulfill its statutory
duty to act in good faith and avoid an unconscionable contract.

Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, TOPHAM
&HARDING
Attorneys at Law
JUSTIN C. STEWART
Attorneys for
Appellants
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